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Abstract 
The advent and spread of information and communication technologies (ICTs) increase potential 
output growth. It is uncertain to what extent and for how long they do so. We use the term “new 
economy” (NE) to describe the acceleration in potential output growth and the attendant and partly 
temporary slowdown in inflation. Assessing the NE is, however, a complicated and delicate task. The 
impact of the NE on the conduct of monetary policy may differ depending on the timescale. In a long-
run perspective, the central bank could capitalise on the NE to set lower inflation targets. In the short 
to medium term, central banks should be cautious when identifying changing patterns in potential 
output growth, as temporary errors in appreciation may have an asymmetrical impact on economic 
stability: the production instability that could result from central banks mistakenly perceiving the advent 
of an NE would be greater than that generated by the failure to recognise a genuine rise in potential 
output growth. 
The advent and spread of information and communication technologies (ICTs) is an ongoing 
technological revolution driven by steady and galloping improvement in the performance of ICTs. A 
case in point: price indices for computer hardware, and more specifically microprocessors, which are 
supposed to take account of improvements in the performance of these goods using hedonic 
techniques, have shed an annual average of roughly 20% (for computer hardware) and 40% (for 
microprocessors) in some three decades. The impact of this revolution is twofold: it has boosted the 
potential output growth rate durably and dampened inflation, at least temporarily. The term “new 
economy” (NE) is used in this paper to depict this twofold effect. 
Our aim here is to describe the impact of the NE on the conduct of monetary policy. We focus first on 
the impact of the NE on the variables that are crucial to monetary policy, namely output growth and 
inflation. We then go on to analyse the consequences for monetary policy, ie the setting by the central 
bank of a short-term interest rate that serves the dual objective of stabilising inflation and output. 
1.  ICTs, potential output growth and measuring potential  
output and inflation 
Performance gains in production yielded by ICTs may impact significantly on the potential output 
growth rate. Various other questions and accounting uncertainties may influence assessment of the 
effects of the widespread use of ICTs on potential output growth or the measurement of price and 
wage developments. 
                                                       
1  This study is a revised version of a paper presented at the 50th Annual Congress of the Association Française de Science 
Économique - AFSE (French Association of Economics), held in Paris on 20 and 21 September 2001 (Cette and 
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1.1  The effects of the spread of ICTs on potential output growth
2 
ICTs may have a dual impact on potential output growth: a sustained impact in the medium to long 
term via capital deepening effects and gains in total factor productivity (TFP), and a more transient 
impact in the short to medium term resulting from the lagged adjustment of average wages to 
productivity. 
1.1.1  Medium- to long-term effects 
The adoption and diffusion of ICTs may have a medium-term effect on potential output growth. This 
effect is the sum of two elements: changes in TFP gains and capital deepening brought on by differing 
trends in the price of investment. 
Figure 1 below depicts the twofold ICT-induced effect on potential output. The figure assumes an 
output of Q0.  A represents the starting point, where the factor costs line is tangent to the initial 
isoquant ISO1. Changes in real factor prices brought about by the spread of ICTs - whose prices, due 
to gains in productive performance, tend to be lower than those for non-ICT investment - alter the 
slope of the costs line and shift the tangency with the isoquant ISO1 from A to B. The shift from A to B 
corresponds to the capital deepening effect referred to above. In addition, possible gains in TFP make 
it possible to achieve the same level of output (Q0) with a smaller input. This corresponds to the shift 
from isoquant ISO1 to isoquant ISO2. The factor costs line is tangent to this new isoquant at C, which 
indicates the input combination minimising the costs of production following the spread of ICTs. 
Figure 1 















Q: Output; K: Fixed productive capital; N: Labour. 
                                                       
2   What follows builds largely on the insights of Cette et al (2002b). Appendix 1 reprises the formalisation, taken from this 
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The rise in the potential output growth rate is a gradual one. The gradual improvement corresponds to 
the time needed for ICTs to become pervasive. Once they are in widespread use, the new potential 
output growth rate is maintained thanks to the constant upgrading of ICTs. Two aspects must be 
stressed: 
•  The roles attributed respectively to TFP and substitution among factors of production in the 
modification of potential output growth depend primarily on the accounting treatment applied 
to the volume-price breakdown of investment series in nominal terms. This observation, 
which is often stressed - see Gordon (2000b)
3 or Stiroh (2001)
4, for instance - forces us to 
put the economic significance of possible changes in the estimated TFP rate into 
perspective. Two opposing cases are possible. If the volume-price breakdown is based 
entirely on a “factor costs” approach, the spread of ICTs has no effect on price inflation - 
potential output gains stem exclusively from gains in TFP.
5 Conversely, if the volume-price 
breakdown is based uniquely on a “services produced” approach, TFP gains amount to zero 
and gains in potential output growth result solely from capital deepening effects. The 
accounting treatment currently applied to the volume-price breakdown of ICT investment is 
based on two approaches.
6 The “services produced” approach is usually based on hedonic 
and matched model methods.
7 Computer hardware is mostly recognised under a “services 
produced” approach in France as well as in the United States. Accounting for computer 
software is based solely on “factor costs” in France. In the United States, some software is 
also recorded using a “services produced” approach, specifically prepackaged software and 
some custom software, ie a total of 50% of software expenditure. The volume-price 
breakdown of own-account and other custom software is based on a “factor costs” approach. 
Lastly, for telecommunications equipment, the volume-price breakdown is based on a 
“services produced” approach solely for digital telephone switching equipment in the 
United States, and otherwise on a “factor costs” approach. To conclude, let us point out that 
these approaches will no doubt evolve significantly in the coming years for computer 
software and telecommunications equipment, with hedonic methods being extended to these 
two types of ICT (Parker and Grimm (2000), Grimm et al (2002)). A number of economists, 
eg Jorgenson(2001)
8 and Gordon (2000b),
9 have called for such change. 
•  In an ICT-producing economy, if the volume-price breakdown is at least partially based on a 
“services produced” approach, the advent of ICTs may keep the lid on growth in output 
prices. In an exclusively ICT-using economy, trends in output prices will not necessarily be 
modified by the emergence of ICTs. The United States is close to falling within the first 
group, while France is close to falling within the second. In fact, if we consider the three 
components of ICT to be computer hardware, computer software and telecommunications 
equipment, it appears that, currently,
10 it is mainly prices of computer hardware - and not 
                                                       
3   “Indeed, the faster the assumed decline in prices for software and communication equipment, the slower is TFP growth in 
the aggregate economy…” Gordon (2000b). 
4   “Note that the neoclassical framework predicts no TFP growth from IT use since all output contributions are due to capital 
accumulation. Computers increase measured TFP only if there are nontraditional effects like increasing returns, production 
spillovers, or network externalities, or if input are measured incorrectly.” Stiroh (2001). 
5   These aspects are discussed in greater detail in Cette et al (2000, 2002a). 
6   For a more detailed presentation of the methods used, see Jorgenson (2001) for the United States and Cette et al (2000), 
which compares the methods used in France and the United States. 
7   Taking into account ICT performance gains using a “services produced” approach does not only involve using hedonic 
methods, it may also be carried out using matched model methods. Consequently, with regard to the US economy, several 
studies by Landefeld and Grimm (2000) show that these two methods arrive at price developments in IT equipment that are 
very similar. 
8    “Unfortunately, software prices are another statistical blind spot with only prices of prepackaged software adequately 
represented in the official system of price statistics. The daunting challenge that lies ahead is to construct constant quality 
price indexes for custom and own-account software”, Jorgenson (2001, p 12). 
9   “The government deflators for software and telecommunication equipment exhibit implausibly low rates of price decline”, 
Gordon (2000b, p 51). 
10   Probably partly due to reasons linked to product-specific differences in the methodologies used in the national accounts to 
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those of computer software or telecommunications equipment - that are diverging from those 
of other capital goods. As it happens, France and the euro area in general produce relatively 
small amounts of computer hardware. 
It is difficult to assess the impact of the spread of ICTs on potential output growth. If the price of 
investment was perfectly measured under a “services produced” approach, the impact would be 
equivalent to the capital deepening effect resulting from the price differential between ICT investment 
and other capital expenditure. However, given that “services produced” are taken very partially into 
account in national accounts price estimates, part of the impact of ICTs on potential output growth is 
attributed in the accounts to TFP gains. 
Cette et al (2002b) estimate that, overall, the spread of ICTs should contribute approximately 1.5 to 
2  percentage points to the US potential output growth rate. This estimate is based on several 
conventional assumptions. The capital deepening effect on potential output growth should slightly 
exceed 1 percentage point annually and the more uncertain TFP effect should run at 1/4 of a 
percentage point to 1 percentage point. Though the latter figure may appear high, it may be attributed 
to the fact that quality changes are currently taken into account only for a limited fraction of ICT 
expenditure, as a factor costs approach is used to measure most of this expenditure (see above). 
Carried out for France, the same assessment finds an impact that is half as significant, given that the 
spread of ICTs is also half as extensive. 
All in all, the spread of ICTs may appear to have a very substantial impact on potential output growth. 
However, the measurements compare a real situation in which ICTs exist to an extreme and 
theoretical situation characterised by the complete absence of ICTs. Moreover, the measurements 
assume that the differential between output price and investment price developments arises entirely 
from the spread of ICTs. This means that the impact of ICTs on potential output growth is magnified 
but also makes it possible to indirectly recognise ICT components that are embedded in capital goods 
and that are, as such, not recorded as ICT investment. Lastly, it should be pointed out that the hitherto 
very limited inclusion of quality effects in measurements of computer software and telecommunications 
equipment prices considerably reduces the capital deepening component. 
1.1.2  Short- to medium-term effects 
The lagged adjustment of average wages, more specifically average labour costs, to the productivity 
level reduces inflationary pressure during the ICT rollout period or, in other words, during the 
productivity boom, and subsequently during the period in which average wages progressively adjust to 
the new productivity path. 
Let us assume that, prior to and following the spread of ICTs, labour productivity grows at a constant 
rate, and that productivity accelerates constantly as ICTs become widespread. Let us also assume a 
lag in the adjustment of average wages, more specifically average labour costs, to the productivity 
level, based for instance on the first-order error correction model proposed by Blanchard and 
Katz (1997). During the ICT diffusion period, the increase in average wages is smaller than the rise in 
productivity. Consequently, the gap between average wages and their equilibrium level increases as a 
percentage of this equilibrium level. Once ICTs have become widespread, growth in average wages 
outpaces that of productivity. The gap between average wages and their equilibrium level therefore 
gradually fades. Once adjustment is complete, barring other shocks, growth in average wages 
matches that of productivity. 
During the entire transition period covering the spread of ICTs and the adjustment of levels in which 
average wages are below their equilibrium level, the NAIRU falls and consequently the level of 
potential gross domestic product (GDP) increases in comparison with a situation in which average 
wages immediately adjust to their equilibrium level. This process is described in several papers, for 
instance Meyer (2000b), Blinder (2000), Ball and Moffit (2001) and Ball and Mankiw (2002). Given 
identical trends in labour productivity, the size of this transition effect depends on the speed at which 
average wages adjust to productivity, which is very difficult to assess. For the United States, assuming 
a very gradual adjustment, Ball and Moffit (2001, pp 24 and 25) estimate the temporary drop in the 
NAIRU, following a productivity surge, at roughly 1 percentage point at the end of the previous 
decade. Assuming a more rapid adjustment - over three years - Cette et al (2002b) arrive at a 
temporary fall in the NAIRU of about 0.2 percentage points. In France, and the euro area as a whole, 
given the slower spread of ICTs and broad-based policies aimed at tempering the rise in productivity, 
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The temporary drop in the NAIRU observed in the United States is therefore not likely to have taken 
place. 
1.2  Other accounting issues or uncertainties
11 
The magnitude and duration of ICT-induced gains in potential output growth are uncertain. There are, 
moreover, a large number of accounting issues pertaining to this constantly and rapidly evolving area. 
1.2.1  The magnitude and duration of gains in potential output growth are uncertain 
A great deal has recently been written on the uncertainties surrounding the extent and duration of TFP 
gains and of capital deepening effects stemming from the spread of ICTs. These uncertainties have 
already been dealt with in Cette et al (2002a,b,c) and shall therefore only be reviewed rapidly here. 
Four types of uncertainty pertaining to the size of the impact of ICTs may be broadly distinguished: 
•  The observed speed-up in TFP gains in the US economy as a whole is very recent. It dates 
back to the mid-1990s. Consequently, some economists, Gordon (2000a,b) for instance, 
believe that a substantial part of this speed-up is likely to be cyclical and an outgrowth of 
US economic expansion in the 1990s. This is not a view that is shared by most other analytic 
studies such as Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), Jorgenson (2001), Jorgenson et al (2001), 
Oliner and Sichel (2000, 2002) or Council of Economic Advisers (2001, 2002). 
•  Strong uncertainty also surrounds the sectoral allocation of TFP gains traceable to the 
spread of ICTs, and the spillover of gains from ICT-producing to ICT-using sectors. However, 
TFP gains are allocated essentially according to the rules applied to the volume-price 
breakdown used for ICTs. This difficulty, described by Cette et al (2000) and 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), requires us to be cautious in discussing the allocation of TFP 
gains to ICT-producing or ICT-using sectors. 
•  Another uncertainty is highlighted in the numerous studies based on individual data that 
focus on the conditions determining whether the spread of ICTs leads to productivity gains 
(see Greenan and Mairesse (2000) or Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) for a detailed examination 
of such studies). The spread of ICTs does not necessarily lead to gains in productive 
efficiency. The existence and extent of these gains is in fact largely determined by other 
aspects, which also hinge on human resources management. 
•  One last major issue concerns industrialised European countries’ capacity to derive real 
benefits from the development of ICTs in respect of real and potential output growth and 
surges in productivity. Gust and Marquez (2000) conclude that the beneficial effects the new 
economy and ICTs have on labour productivity and TFP will eventually materialise in all 
industrialised countries. The magnitude of these effects and the duration of the time lag with 
the United States nevertheless remain uncertain. Uncertainty about the magnitude of the 
effects stems mainly from our patchy knowledge of the positive interaction, occurring via 
spillover effects, between ICT-producing and ICT-using industries. If this interaction is 
substantial, Europe will enjoy more limited ICT-induced gains than the United States given 
its smaller ICT-producing industry.
12 
There is also strong uncertainty about the duration of ICT-related performance gains. The main 
efficiency gains result from microprocessors, whose processing power has constantly kept pace with 
“Moore’s Law”, which predicts the doubling of processing power every 18 to 24 months. 
Jorgenson (2001) stresses that it would be rash to extrapolate this trend ad infinitum. Whether or not 
Moore’s Law will continue to hold in ICT-producing industries is not the only vexed issue concerning 
                                                       
11  What follows is based to a large extent on Cette et al (2002a,b,c). 
12  Pilat and Lee (2001, pp 21-2) offer several reasons why a sizeable ICT-producing sector is not a prerequisite for deriving full 
benefits in terms of growth: proximity to producers of computer software could be more relevant than proximity to producers 
of computer hardware. Besides, several countries, for example Australia, appear to benefit significantly from using ICTs 
without necessarily boasting a large ICT-producing industry. The contribution of ICTs to economic growth in European 
countries could therefore expand substantially in Europe, and more specifically in France, in the coming years. 218  BIS Papers No 19
 
performance gains. Gordon (2000b) also raises doubts about human ability to fully exploit increasing 
computer capability. 
1.2.2  Lingering accounting uncertainties 
Methods used in the national accounts to refine estimations of new economy-related variables have 
improved significantly in recent years. These improvements aim for instance to take better account of 
quality effects and in particular the performance gains arising from business investment in ICT. This 
has led Gordon (2000b, 2002) to posit that the impact of the introduction and spread of ICTs on output 
and productivity growth is not necessarily more profound than that of previous technological 
“revolutions” such as the invention of the steam engine in the 19th century or of electricity at the start 
of the 20th. In fact, such a comparison is undermined by the fact that estimates of inputs and 
especially outputs have been extensively refined in recent decades. Via a drop in prices and an 
accompanying increase in volumes, these estimates now take better account of qualitative 
improvements that were overlooked in previous statistics, such as increasingly comfortable rail 
transport and housing. However, in an assessment of the US economy over a very long period, 
Crafts (2002) estimated that, since 1974 and especially 1995, the contribution made by ICTs to annual 
output and productivity growth has vastly surpassed that made by the steam engine in 1830-60, the 
period in which it was most widely used, and exceeded that made by electricity in 1899-1929 and even 
1919-29. Fraumeni (2001) and Litan and Rivlin (2001) also underline that a raft of varying ICT-induced 
improvements in the quality of certain services, such as commercial and health services, are not 
recognised in national accounting statistics. Output growth would therefore appear to be currently 
understated. 
Notwithstanding these improvements in national accounting methods, supply and use balances are 
still established according to conventions that have an impact on the assessment of GDP level and 
growth. Lequiller (2000) expounds on this. He shows that the breakdown of ICT resources between 
final use and intermediate use is based on different methodologies in the United States and in France, 
and more generally Europe. This apparently results in a larger share being attributed to final use, and 
therefore to higher GDP growth, in the United States than in Europe. Given that, on average, 
ICT-related activities tend to develop faster than other activities, this methodological difference should 
have a significant impact not only on the level of GDP but also its growth rate. Lequiller’s analysis 
clearly illustrates some uncertainties in the assessment of growth that inevitably result from ICTs. It 
also highlights the uncertainties in the GDP estimate that may result from the complicated breakdown - 
based on accounting rules that are in themselves questionable - of the use of certain ICT-related 
goods and services, such as mobile telephony goods and services, between households and 
businesses. 
In this constantly evolving area, accounting methods are changing in all countries and may differ from 
one country to another. The US consumer price index is a case in point: the Boskin report (1996) led 
to a host of methodological changes that were aimed at improving assessments of consumer price 
inflation. Volume-price breakdown methods applied to ICTs in particular have also evolved 
considerably in a number of countries. The changes aim to take better account of quality effects 
(Cette et al (2000)). When these accounting changes are not applied to the entire historical period 
available, they can lead to discontinuities that make it difficult to analyse developments in the prices 
and volumes of the variables concerned. 
The consequences of methodological changes are more complex than they appear to be 
(Lequiller  (2000)). Hence, a change in the volume-price breakdown that increases the volume for 
certain ICT goods and services may increase real GDP for the reasons referred to above, but this 
increase is tempered by the intermediate use that resident agents make of imports of these goods and 
services. Landefeld and Grimm’s (2000) analysis of US Bureau of Economic Analysis methodology 
shows, on the basis of a large number of studies, that using hedonic techniques to carry out the 
volume-price breakdown of ICTs does not appear to significantly affect the measurement of real GDP 
and the GDP deflator. However, the authors propose a comparison with matched model methods, 
which take quality effects largely into account. A broader comparison with factor cost approaches, 
which are closer to those used to measure countless other goods and services, would be more 
appropriate here. 
Another source of uncertainty lies in the fact that the share of ICTs in the output and expenditure of 
economic agents has expanded considerably in recent decades (Mairesse et al (2000)). 
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good, the methodology structure has evolved to increasingly include methods that take better account 
of changes in quality, for instance hedonic indices. This change in structure could therefore affect the 
“average methodology” of the volume-price breakdown, leading to a shift in emphasis from price to 
volume to an extent that is unknown. 
Lastly, in the future, measurement methods shall continue to evolve to better capture quality changes 
in certain ICT goods and services. The example of computer software and telecommunications 
equipment discussed above is probably one of the most significant, as in France and the 
United States, these goods and services account for over 1.5% and 2.5% of GDP respectively. These 
methodological changes are bound to have a significant impact on the measurement of GDP prices 
and volumes. The same is true for other ICT goods and services that are on the rise, such as mobile 
telephony (Lequiller (2000)). Uncertainties about the measurement of ICTs and the volume-price 
breakdown methods that are applied to them are therefore relevant not only to the past but also to the 
future. 
2.  Taking the “new economy” into account in the conduct of 
monetary policy 
Taking the “new economy” (NE) into account in the conduct of monetary policy is done here in the 
framework of a Taylor rule.
13 This raises two difficulties: 
•  In the long term, it is acknowledged that inflation, control of which is the primary objective of 
monetary policy, is a monetary phenomenon. Yet, growth in money supply is not taken into 
account in the simple Taylor rule. However, this rule does incorporate two factors that make 
it possible to determine whether monetary growth is inflationary: the inflation target and 
potential output or, more specifically, deviations in the trends observed in relation to these 
variables. 
•  The simple Taylor rule is generally not optimal, in the sense that it would make it possible to 
minimise a priori a quadratic loss function for the central bank. However, it does have 
advantages in terms of ease of use and communication. Furthermore, it is possible to modify 
some of its parameters in order to reduce the deviations of inflation and output from their 
target. We shall focus here on this approach. 
Using simulations, we will examine how the NE can be taken into account in the conduct of monetary 
policy from a long-term and a short- to medium-term perspective. 
2.1  What are the implications for the conduct of monetary policy in the long term? 
In the long term, within a Fisherian approach, the nominal interest rate is the sum of real interest rate 
and expected inflation. Now, by raising the economy’s potential output growth rate, the NE should 
result in a rise in the long-term equilibrium real interest rate: the productivity boom increases the 
profitability of investment, pushing up the real interest rate, which allows saving and investment to 
balance in line with full employment. Although monetary policy only controls the short-term nominal 
interest rate, it may take into account rises in the equilibrium real interest rate by reducing the gap 
between the “natural” and “market” rates, as defined by Wicksell.
14 However, as this form of passive 
adjustment of monetary policy to the NE is inevitable in the long term, it is not simulated in this paper. 
Furthermore, to the extent that monetary policy is credible, inflation expectations should correspond to 
the central bank’s inflation target. Central banks then have two choices. They can either take 
advantage of the sustainable positive supply shock, arising from the NE, to lower their targets - to be 
credible, the target decrease must be a permanent one. Or they can choose to leave the inflation 
target unchanged and focus on stabilising inflation rather than stabilising output. For simplicity, these 
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choices are simulated in a polar fashion: the simple Taylor rule is compared with a form of inflation 
targeting in which, in a Taylor rule, the inflation stabilisation coefficient is equal to one and the output 
stabilisation coefficient is zero. In reality, however, both choices can be combined, and this is made 
even easier if the NE spontaneously results in the economy becoming less cyclical, thanks to, for 
example, better management of durable goods inventories.
15 
We therefore compare two monetary policy variants affecting the parameters of the Taylor rule: 
lowering the inflation target, and stabilising inflation. The latter is sometimes recommended in the 
event of a permanent acceleration in productivity.
16 The simulations were carried out using a highly 
simplified model of a closed economy described in Appendix 2, and the MARCOS model developed at 
the Bank of France.
17 In the reference scenario, the NE is simulated by an exogenous increase in the 
growth rate of potential output (1% in the first model), or in productivity (0.2% in MARCOS). Where the 
inflation target is lowered, it is reduced by 1 percentage point. These simulations cannot claim to be a 
faithful representation of the economic reality, but are simply for illustrative purposes: the model is 
highly simplified, and the calculations made under the MARCOS model incorporate a technology 
shock in a single economy similar to the French economy. The results are summarised in Table 1 and 





Monetary policy variants 
Monetary policy rule  Taylor rule  Stabilising inflation 
Changing the inflation target  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Simplified model 









Loss on output gap    0.078   0.117    0.077    0.114 
Total loss    0.091    0.137    0.090    0.133 
MARCOS 









Loss on output gap    35.18   40.18    37.71    45.98 
Total loss    40.40    42.38    52.40    56.18 
 
These variants provide the following information: 
•  Overall, the comparison of monetary policy rules comes out somewhat in favour of the Taylor 
rule. Indeed, the simplified model shows that there is a marginal advantage in stabilising 
inflation, but the substantial advantage of the Taylor rule in MARCOS is more consistent with 
a scenario in which taking the output gap into account results in a lower inflation rate. 
                                                       
15  McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000). 
16 Cechetti  (2002). 
17  MARCOS (Modèle à Anticipations Rationnelles de la Conjoncture Simulée) is a calibrated rational expectations model of the 
French economy. It is chiefly designed for carrying out medium- to long-term simulations. It was built under the assumption 
of a small country with monopolistic competition in product and labour markets, in which wages are negotiated in 
accordance with a right-to-manage model of the labour market, and the consumption of households, which do not face 
liquidity constraints, is led by intertemporal optimisation behaviour under the life cycle hypothesis. See Jacquinot and 
Mihoubi (2000). 
18  The discount rate is 3.5% in the simplified model and equal to the short-term real interest rate of the reference scenario in 
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•  The reduction of the inflation target is always favourable, as the NE is spontaneously 
disinflationary. Furthermore, it only has a moderate impact on output, particularly in 
MARCOS. 
It should, however, be noted that the effects of lowering the inflation target are analysed here in a 
highly simplified form, without considering the optimal non-zero inflation rate.
19 Much has been written 
about the economic costs of inflation, such as menu costs, “inflationary tax”, greater price fluctuations 
leading to a higher degree of uncertainty of expectations, etc. Similarly, in the presence of downward 
nominal rigidities of wages and other prices, the “optimal” relative price adjustment could require a 
minimal level of inflation. Therefore, an inflation-unemployment trade-off would appear in the low 
inflation range, and lowering an already low inflation target could result in a cost in terms of output 
growth. While this representation is theoretically relevant, the empirical measurement of nominal 
rigidities, and thus of “optimal” inflation, is nevertheless difficult (INSEE (1997)). In addition, nominal 
rigidities are probably related to past inflation, which contributes to shaping expectations: for the same 
level of current inflation, these rigidities would be greater in the aftermath of periods of high inflation, 
and weaker following a prolonged period of low inflation, such as that experienced by industrialised 
countries since the mid-1980s. Lastly, these rigidities are not present across the board: ICT prices fall. 
2.2  Managing the transition towards the “new economy” in the short to medium term 
In the short to medium term, the new economy raises the issue of transition management - the same 
problem crops up, in opposing terms, once the NE has petered out. Specifically, the spread of the NE 
spawns new factors of uncertainty in the conduct of monetary policy. Uncertainties are pervasive in the 
measurement of output and prices, the duration of the trend that is placed under the NE banner (and 
hence its actual existence, as it must be sustainable in order to be qualified as such) and in changes 
in behaviour, and therefore in the accompanying monetary policy transmission channel. 
2.2.1  Short- to medium-term dynamics 
The spread of the NE has two opposing impacts on prices: 
•  A so-called “direct” disinflationary effect resulting from a lagged indexation of real wages to 
productivity that leads to a temporary drop in the NAIRU;
20 and 
•  A demand effect in the form of a double boom in corporate investment and household 
consumption. The boom in investment is triggered by the profit opportunities attendant on 
the uptake of new technologies, the drop in relative prices of high-tech equipment and the 
decrease in the cost of financing ICT investment due to the surge in the prices of equities 
issued by ICT-related companies. The boom in consumer spending is spurred by the wealth 
effect fed by soaring equity prices and the promising outlook for labour income. 
In such an environment, the central bank is in a position to choose between two favourable scenarios: 
turning to advantage the speed-up in productivity growth to allow a further increase in output at an 
unchanged rate of inflation, or combining a reduction in inflation with a more gradual pickup in output. 
This alternative was presented by a governor of the Federal Reserve Board, who believes that the 
productivity surge was mainly used in the United States to boost output temporarily and, to a lesser 
extent, to lower inflation.
21 
This view could be taken even further: 
•  The “direct” disinflationary effect is a temporary companion to the more permanent effect 
resulting from the increase in TFP. It is this more sustained effect that may enable the 
                                                       
19  Akerlof et al (1996), Wyplosz (2000). 
20  Meyer (2000a,b), Ball and Mankiw (2002), Ball and Moffit (2001), Cette et al (2002b). 
21  Meyer (2000b). Gordon (2000a) also points out the following: “... by helping to hold down inflationary pressures in the last 
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lowering of the inflation target, while the “direct” disinflationary effect permits an 
“opportunistic” slowdown of inflation. 
•  The “direct” disinflationary effect and the demand effect are to some extent mutually 
exclusive. Notably, the “direct” disinflationary effect can only occur if the spurt in productivity 
is unforeseen or deemed short-lived, but in such cases, the increase in corporate equity 
prices and expectations of a rise in labour income are not as robust. This is a point worth 
making in view of the potential spread of the NE worldwide and particularly in Europe. The 
precedent set in the United States could in fact lead private economic agents to adjust their 
demand to the rise in their permanent income, and to factor the pickup in productivity into 
wage negotiations more quickly than they did in the United States. The “direct” disinflationary 
effect would therefore be less pronounced. 
•  As concerns actions taken by the Federal Reserve (Fed), a study of the minutes of meetings 
of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) shows that, contrary to what is suggested 
by Ball and Tchaidze (2002), FOMC members, while being aware as in 1996 of a possible 
acceleration in trend productivity growth, did not explicitly attach great importance to the drop 
in the NAIRU. In the second half of the 1990s, the FOMC appeared to be striving rather to 
stabilise one specific indicator of inflation, the core PCE deflator.
22 In any case, the Fed’s 
policy has drawn mixed reactions. On the one hand it has been criticised for leaving a limited 
legacy by favouring “covert inflation targeting” over explicit rules.
23 On the other hand, the 
Fed under the chairmanships of Volcker and Greenspan has been applauded for taking 
better account of technology shocks than had been done previously.
24 On the latter point, it 
must nonetheless be noted that the NE emerged a long time after Paul Volcker had taken 
office (see below), and that it is easier for monetary policy to take account of supply shocks 
when these shocks are positive, as in the case of the NE, than when they are negative, 
eg rising oil prices. 
2.2.2  Taking uncertainties into account 
Economic policymakers are generally faced with three types of uncertainty:
25 uncertainty about the 
state of the economy or economic data, known as “additive” uncertainty (referred to here as type 1 
uncertainty), uncertainty about the parameters of the model underlying the economy, termed 
“multiplicative” uncertainty (type 2) and uncertainty about the model itself (type 3). 
Among the forms of uncertainty fed by the advent of the NE, type 1 uncertainty is probably the 
greatest in Europe. It is linked to the extent and timing of a new economy, and therefore to its 
measurement (see ECB (2001)). This type of uncertainty calls for an attenuated response to data that 
might be subject to measurement error - in this case output and inflation.
26 This approach, which 
appears to correspond to central bank behaviour,
27 presses the case for taking the NE cautiously and 
progressively into account in the conduct of monetary policy. 
Uncertainty about the duration of the NE, and the behavioural changes that may go along with it, ranks 
as type 2 or even type 3 uncertainty. Studies conducted to date do not, however, arrive at an 
unequivocal conclusion on the impact of the NE on monetary policy transmission channels. 
Ehrmann and Ellison (2001), for instance, show that since 1984 US industrial response to monetary 
policy has been increasingly sluggish. The authors attribute this to the fact that new technologies 
enable companies to keep a closer eye on inventories and more easily adjust production levels. They 
therefore now prefer to wait for demand to change before adjusting production, whereas before they 
would have anticipated changes in demand. This study nevertheless raises at least two problems. The 
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23 Mankiw  (2001). 
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first is a dating problem. The authors reprise research by McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), who 
show that there was a structural break in the volatility of output in the United States in the first quarter 
of 1984. However, in monetary policy terms, the break is usually situated in 1979, at the time Paul 
Volcker took up his post,
28 while in NE terms, the pickup in labour productivity in the United States was 
observed only in the second half of the 1990s. Ehrmann and Ellison then develop a model for output 
trends based on the capacity utilisation rate, even though ICTs might have led to a break in the 
“optimal” level of this variable precisely because inventories were managed more efficiently. 
Conversely, referring to the expectations hypothesis of the interest rate structure and to the fact that 
the NE has been accompanied by a reduction in the service life of capital, von Kalckreuth and 
Schröder (2002) maintain that the NE must have increased the efficiency of the transmission channel 
by cutting the time to maturity of the interest rate that enters into investment decisions. However, they 
do not verify their postulate. In any case, long-standing research shows that type 2 uncertainty, like 
type 1, calls for gradualism.
29 Admittedly, it has been proven more recently that an aggressive 
monetary policy may be justified in cases where inflation is very persistent.
30 However, if monetary 
policy is credible, there is little chance of this assumption being verified.
31 As far as type 3 uncertainty 
is concerned, it may, in a first instance, call for an aggressive strategy when the central bank, faced 
with radical uncertainty, wishes to ensure a minimum outcome
32 - in the case under consideration, it 
would allow real interest rates to drop sharply if it wished to ensure that the NE took off at all costs. In 
a second approach, robustness is achieved by ensuring that the monetary policy decision delivers 
similar results irrespective of the model used.
33 This is a stance typical of central banks, which often 
have several models or representations of the economy. It is the approach used here. 
The NE and the faster productivity growth that comes in its wake create uncertainties for monetary 
policy. These uncertainties are simulated by two International Monetary Fund (IMF) economists using 
the MULTIMOD model. Three scenarios are analysed.
34 In the first scenario, the central bank and the 
private sector correctly perceive the productivity shock when it occurs. In the second, the central bank 
and the private sector mistakenly perceive a productivity shock of the same size and revise their 
mistaken perception after five years. In the third scenario, the central bank’s error, one it makes alone, 
is that it only perceives the productivity shock five years after it has occurred. Compared with the 
baseline scenario, in which there is no shock, it appears that the central bank’s error in being slow to 
perceive the emergence of the NE entails costs in terms of the stability of production and inflation. 
However, the highest costs result from the two sectors mistakenly perceiving the development of an 
NE. In this case, the inflation speed-up would need to be tamped down by a tough monetary policy 
stance - all the more so because potential output growth has fallen short of expectations. 
The simplified model laid out in Appendix 2 finds these two results. The model simulates two types of 
technology shock that increase the potential output growth rate by 1 percentage point: a one-off shock 
that occurs in the first year, and a permanent shock. Like in Bayoumi and Hunt’s (2000) simulation, the 
central bank is faced with a situation of uncertainty. In both cases, it may believe that a permanent 
technology shock has occurred and accordingly adjust its assessment of potential output. This affects 
the output gap used in the Taylor rule. If the central bank believes that a technology shock has 
occurred, it may revise its assessment of potential output and also lower its inflation target by 
1 percentage point. The results are summarised in Table 2, which indicates total loss on inflation and 
output. 
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Table 2 
Uncertainty about the NE and monetary policy stance 
Monetary policy rule  Taylor rule  Stabilising inflation 
Changing the assessment of 
potential output  Yes  No Yes No 
Changing the inflation target  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Loss in the event of a trend shock  0.091 0.137 0.175 0.090 0.133 0.162 
Loss in the event of a one-off shock  0.198 0.200 0.181 0.193 0.196 0.156 
 
The lessons from the simplified variants are as follows: 
•  Loss is exacerbated if the central bank is mistaken in its analysis, irrespective of whether the 
shock is a trend or a temporary shock. Error therefore entails a cost, which seems logical. 
•  Losses are greater when the central bank mistakenly perceives a trend shock than when it 
fails to recognise a true shock. This asymmetry, which stems primarily from loss on the 
stability of economic activity, may be “intuitively” explained as follows. If the central bank 
mistakenly perceives a trend shock, it spurs a speed-up in the output growth rate beyond the 
unchanged potential rate. Becoming aware of its mistake, the bank then strives to put a 
brake on output growth, to bring it below its potential rate until the inflationary pressures 
have dissipated, so as to finally allow output growth to match its potential rate. If the central 
bank fails to recognise a true rise in potential output growth, it strives to keep output growth 
at its previous potential rate. Once it perceives its error, it endeavours to propel output 
growth beyond its potential rate until the disinflationary pressures have dissipated to finally 
allow output growth to match its new potential rate. In other words, if, for the sake of 
simplicity, it is assumed that monetary policy is immediately and totally effective, the output 
growth rate would change three times in the first case and only twice in the second. This 
asymmetry requires the central bank to be cautious in identifying the possible development 
of an NE. 
•  If an NE is proven to have emerged, the losses are alleviated by the lowering of the inflation 
target. This is simply attributable to the fact that the lowering of the target goes along with 
the temporary disinflationary shock arising from the development of the NE. Conversely, if 
the central bank wrongly perceives a trend shock and lowers its inflation target, losses are 
higher. Central banks must therefore be especially prudent when lowering inflation targets. 
In addition to uncertainty about the development of an NE, uncertainty about the measurement of 
inflation and GDP that ensues from this new situation could make a Taylor rule and inflation targeting 
temporarily less effective. In its conduct of monetary policy, it could therefore be in the central bank’s 
interest to take account of other indicators that could help shore up its cyclical analysis. Potential 
indicators include: 
•  Money supply: the financial innovations brought on by the NE, such as the issuance of 
electronic money, financial disintermediation or the increased substitutability between 
financial assets that results from the fall in transaction costs, could nevertheless give 
impetus to the velocity of money, ie in the case of the euro area, they could curb the fall in 
the velocity of M3. This rise in velocity, which is difficult to assess, would counter the impact 
that the increase in potential output growth has on money supply. It is therefore quite difficult 
to speculate on how the long-term relationship between money and prices could evolve with 
the development of an NE. 
•  Nominal GDP: as the development of the NE could lead to an inflation measurement error 
that more or less offsets the GDP measurement error, the case could be made for paying 
closer attention to trends in nominal income when defining interest rate policy. However, the 
shortcomings inherent in targeting nominal income, rather than prices, remain patent, BIS Papers No 19  225
 
particularly the fact that such a strategy implies potentially infinite inflation and output 
variances.
35 Consequently, this strategy would appear to be ill equipped to adequately 
protect the economy from shocks other than NE-related uncertainty, notably that arising from 
measurement error. 
•  Survey data or information provided by financial markets: given that they are partially 
subjective, these sources of information - more so than data resulting partly from accounting 
conventions - could take account of changes in behaviour that may occur with the advent of 
the NE. It is true that they could also reflect errors in perception made by the private sector, 
but at the end of the day, they would make it possible to cross-check the information 
supplied by the national accounts, increasing the soundness of the cyclical analysis. 
3. Conclusion 
The adjustment of monetary policy to the new NE-engendered environment has been analysed 
entirely from the perspective of interest rate policy. The role played by other economic policies, as well 
as the international environment or the difficulties that the NE could raise for the implementation of 
monetary policy have been overlooked. It is nevertheless worth touching on the findings of a number 
of studies carried out on these aspects. We shall do so by way of conclusion. 
•  Structural policies can pave the way for an NE to emerge and develop. They could do so 
notably by giving free rein to the different competitive forces in order to reduce nominal 
rigidities in the transition phase, and in the longer term by creating an environment that 
nurtures technical progress with a view to boosting potential supply and passing on the fall in 
production costs. Fiscal policy can also limit the rise in the real equilibrium interest rate by 
improving the government budget balance.
36 
•  By acting as a driver of internal demand and improving corporate profitability, an NE worsens 
the current account balance and triggers capital inflows into the country in which it has 
developed, leading, in the short to medium term, to a rise in the exchange rate.
37 
•   Various authors
38 have highlighted two ways in which monetary policy could lose its 
effectiveness and the central bank its financial independence as a result of the NE-related 
technology upheaval. The first way would be via the dwindling use of central bank money in 
transactions due to the spread of electronic money, held as a claim on securities, and the 
complete securitisation of the financing of the economy. The second way would be through 
an erosion in the demand for central bank reserves, with the same factors leading to the 
establishment of clearing systems outside the purview of the central bank, and possibly 
limiting demand for banknotes to the financing of underground activities. The only way to 
avoid what Friedman (2000) calls a “decoupling at the margin” that would render monetary 
policy ineffective and the level of prices indeterminate, would then be to impose legal 
constraints - for example, by making it mandatory for taxpayers to pay their taxes in liabilities 
drawn against the central bank, as suggested by Goodhart (2000). The risk of decoupling is, 
however, probably very slight. Above all, like Woodford (2000), we may question financial 
markets’ ability to generate an equilibrium interest rate that would allow intertemporal 
arbitrage while maintaining purchasing power. Financial markets would therefore continue to 
be in need of an institution that is not in competition with them, that entails no credit risk and 
whose balance sheet items provide a reference for the setting of short-term interest rates; 
namely, a central bank. Legal constraints would therefore be unwarranted. 
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Appendix 1:  
Formalising the spread of ICTs and potential output growth 
This formalisation is taken from Cette et al (2002b). 
As indicated in the study, medium- to long-term effects are distinguished from short- to medium-term 
effects. 
Medium- to long-term effects 
Assume a Cobb-Douglas production function with unit returns to scale and autonomous Hicks-neutral 
technological progress (the effects of this technological progress therefore match TFP gains): 
α − α γ =
1         N K e A Q
t   and  output  growth  rate: 
o o o
N K Q   ) 1 (   α − + α + γ =  (1) 
In the long term, at the potential level of the variables, the capital output ratio remains constant: 
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The following expression for potential output growth is derived from the previous equations: 
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The advent and spread of ICTs may have a twofold impact: an increase in TFP gains and a slowdown 
in the real price of investment. It is also assumed that in the medium to long term, the spread of ICTs 
does not change the potential employment level (N*′ = N*), which means that in the medium to long 
term it impacts neither on the level of the NAIRU (U*′ = U*) nor on the potential labour supply 
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The gains in potential output growth resulting from the spread of ICTs are given as the difference 
between equations (4) and (3): 
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The change in the potential output growth rate caused by the spread of ICTs is the sum of the two 





 corresponds to the effect of the change in TFP gains, the second 
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 to the capital deepening effect caused by the difference between the 
change in output price and the change in the price of investment. 
Short- to medium-term effects 
For simplicity, we assume that labour productivity grows at a constant rate, before and after the spread 
of ICTs, and that productivity accelerates at a constant rate during the rollout period. The ICT rollout BIS Papers No 19  227
 
period spans from date t1 to date t2. Labour productivity can be written in a simplified form using the 
following logarithms: 
3 1  ) ( λ + λ = − t n q  before the rollout period, when t < t1 (6.1) 
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t t
t t
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λ + λ  during this period. 
For labour costs (more specifically per capita labour costs), we assume, as do Meyer (2000b), Blinder 
(2000), Ball and Moffit (2001) and Ball and Mankiw (2002), that growth in labour costs smoothly 
adjusts to the rise in productivity. This lagged adjustment is given by the simplified equation: 




U N Q L P W , with  1 ) 1 ( = φ  (7) 
Before the spread of ICTs (ie before t1) or once ICTs have become totally widespread (after t2) and 
once growth in labour costs has adjusted completely to productivity, the “long-term” NAIRU is easily 
deducted from equation (7):  3 1 * β β = / U  
In the shorter term, during the ICT rollout period, due to the lagged adjustment of growth in labour 
costs to that of productivity, we have ) / ( ) / )( ( ° ° φ N Q N Q L p . The NAIRU is therefore temporarily lower 
than its long-term level, as shown by Meyer (2000b): 
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The fact that the NAIRU is temporarily lower than its long-term level enables a temporary gain in 
potential GDP. Potential employment N* is defined by the equation: 
N* = (1 − U*)POP* 
where POP* denotes the potential labour supply whose level is unchanged by the spread of ICTs 
(POP* = POP). 
From the logarithmic equation (1) and equation (9), we therefore derive the temporary gain in the 
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This temporary gain in the potential GDP level corresponds to a similarly temporary gain in the 
economy’s potential output growth. 
Notations 
Q  Volume of output 
K  Volume of fixed productive capital 
N  Volume of labour 
POP Labour  supply 
PQ  Price of output 
PK  Price of investment in fixed productive capital 
Pc  Price of household consumption 
W  Per capita labour costs 
U  Unemployment rate, with N = (1 − U)POP and L* = (1 − U*)POP*, U* denoting the NAIRU 
α  Elasticity of output as a ratio to capital 
β1, β2, β3  Coefficients in equation (7) denoting labour cost formation 228  BIS Papers No 19
 
λ1, λ2, λ3  Coefficients in equation (6) denoting trends in labour productivity 
γ  Autonomous technological progress, ie gains in TFP 
t Time  variable 
t1 and t2  Start and end of the ICT rollout period 
L  Time lag operator 
φ(L)  Polynomial of the time lag operator in the labour cost equation (7), with φ(1) = 1 
“CT”  as a subscript of a variable indicates that it is the short- to medium-term value of this variable 
“
o”  above a variable denotes its growth rate 
“*”  as an exponent of a variable denotes its potential level 
“′”  as an exponent of a variable denotes its level during the ICT rollout period 
“∆”  in front of a variable denotes the differential between the two situations before and after 
the spread of ICTs 
Variables in lower case correspond to their logarithms 
“−1”  as a subscript denotes a lagged variable BIS Papers No 19  229
 
Appendix 2: 
Technology shock and monetary policy: a highly simplified model 
A highly simplified model illustrates the impact transitory and protracted technology shocks have on 
GDP growth and inflation, assuming different monetary policy responses. It corresponds to a closed 
economy or to the global economy. 
We define ex ante potential output (QEA) as the level of potential output excluding the effects of 
fluctuations in the real interest rate. In the absence of a technology shock, ex ante potential output 
(QEASC) is assumed to grow at a constant rate. A technology shock alters the ex ante potential output 
growth rate, which is then denoted as QEAAC. There are two possible types of technology shock. The 
first, which is transitory, is characterised by a 1 percentage point pickup in the growth rate of ex ante 
potential output over one period. The second and protracted shock is typified by a steady 
1 percentage point increase in the growth rate of ex ante potential output. 
Variations in the real interest rate are prompted by supply shocks that gradually impact on the level of 
potential output. This effect is denoted by equation (1) assuming that the supply shock (as a 
percentage) is proportional to the smoothed and lagged gap between the real interest rate and real 
output growth. The gap is smoothed by averaging gap values over four periods: 
1 , ) (   − − ∆ − = 1
o
Q TARGET TIRHC a etir  (1) 
The volume of ex post potential output, ie including the supply shocks corresponding to fluctuations in 
the real interest rate, is therefore written: 
qep = qeaac + etir  (2) 
The adjustment of the volume of actual output (Q) to the volume of ex post potential output (QEP) is 
represented using a second-order error correction model. The advantage of this model is that it leads 
in the long term to a perfect adjustment, and in the short to medium term to cyclical differences that 
are supposed to correspond to the dynamic accelerator-multiplier equation and to the effects of 
economic agents’ mistaken expectations about the nature and size of the technology shock. 
Therefore: 
q = φ(L) [qep],  with:  2
2 0 1 0
2
2 1 0
  ) 1 (   )   2 2 ( 1
   
) (
L b b L b b
L b L b b
L
+ − + + + − +
+ +
= φ  where φ(1) = 1 is verified  (3) 
The ex ante (eqea) and ex post output gap is the (logarithmic) difference between the volume of actual 
output (q) and the volume of potential output, ex ante in the absence of a shock (qeasc) and ex post 
(qep) respectively: 
eqea = q − qeasc  and  eqep = q − qep (4) 
Compared to a situation without a shock where the output gap is assumed to be zero, an inflation 
differential is created by the non-nullity of the smoothed ex post output gap (the gap is smoothed by 
averaging gap values over two periods): 
1   eqep c P
o
= ∆   (5) 
Lastly, monetary policy corresponds to the application of a Taylor rule. When applying this rule, the 
parameter for weighting the inflation differential and the output gap may, however, be modified, as the 
rule may be transformed into a simple inflation target (if α = 1). We also use Bayoumi and Hunt’s 
(2000) two opposing assumptions in which the central bank may fail to recognise a technology shock 
and therefore fail to modify its assessment of potential output, or on the contrary, take it into account. 
In the following notations, the central bank correctly perceives a shock where d = 1 and fails to do so 
where d = 0. 
SC A QE d AC A QE d eqea d eqep d P TIR
ο ο o
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Output (PQ) and inflation (PP) losses are calculated as the discounted quadratic sum over 100 years 
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r
PP  (7) 
Standard values are used for the various parameters of this simplified model: a = −0.75; b0 = 0.70; 
b1 = 0.1; b2 = 0.1; c = 0.5; d = 1 if the central bank perceives an NE, and 0 if it does not;  , 1 0 ≤ α ≤  
α = 0.5 if there is a Taylor rule and 1 if there is inflation targeting; e = 0 or 1; r = 3.5%. 
Notations 
Q  Volume of actual output, denoted by equation (3) 
QEASC  Volume of ex ante potential output in the absence of a shock, given by assumption 
QEAAC  Volume of ex ante potential output in the presence of a shock, given by assumption 
QEP  Volume of ex post potential output, denoted by equation (2) 
eqea  Ex ante output gap (relative), denoted by equation (4) 
eqep  Ex post output gap (relative), denoted by equation (4) 
etir   Impact (as a relative gap) of real interest rate fluctuations on potential GDP volume, 
denoted by equation (1) 
o
P  Inflation 
TIR   Real interest rate, denoted by equation (6) 
TIRHC   Level of real interest rate excluding variations in the central bank’s inflation target 
TARGET  Central bank’s inflation target 
r   Discount rate 
PQ  Loss on output, denoted by equation (7) 
PP  Loss on inflation, denoted by equation (7) 
a  Parameter in equation (1) that reflects the impact of fluctuations in the real interest 
rate on output 
b0, b1 and b2  Parameters in equation (3) that reflect the adjustment of output to its potential level 
c  Parameter in equation (5) that reflects the impact of the output gap on inflation 
d  Parameter in equation (6) that reflects whether or not the central bank has 
identified a technology shock 
α  Parameter in the Taylor rule, equation (6) 
φ(L)   Polynomial of the time lag operator L 
A variable in lower case indicates that it is expressed logarithmically or as a relative gap for output gaps. 
“
o”  above a variable indicates the growth rate of this variable over time. 
“∆”  in front of a variable indicates the differential in this variable compared with a 
situation in which there is no technology shock. 
“l ”  as a subscript indicates that this is a smoothed variable, with equal weighting. 
Smoothing is carried out over four periods in equation (1) and over two periods in 
equation (5). 
“−1”  as a subscript indicates that the variable has a time lag of one period. 
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